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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
J_._-\_jiES SDRALES and
VIRGIXI~-\. Z_._-\~IBOUKOS,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No.

80031

vs.
S_._-1ji RONDOS,

Defendant arnd

Ap~pellant.

BRIEF O·F DEFENDAN'T AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT
'This is an action commenced by the p1aintiffs to enjoin the defendant from trespassing u·pon lands claim·ed
by the pJaintiffs. Def~endant counterclaimed and asked
to have the Court determine that the defendant had
acquired a right by prescription to a 12-foot strip, exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tending from West Temple on the West, thence East 165
feet to defendant's property. The defendant prosecutes
this app~al from the judgment of the lower court enjoining defendan t fr~m using the right-of-way and denyi;ng defendant's counterclaim.
1

This action involves property in down-town Salt
Lake City, located on the south side of Second :South
and immediately to the east of West Temple 'Stre·et. The
Plaza Hotel is located on the southeast corner of the
intersection of Second South and West Temple, and east
of this hotel are small shop·s, cafes, be·er ·parlors, restaurants, cleaning establishments, etc., extending east to
def.endant's property. The property of :the defendant is
located at 63-65 West Second South ·Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah, and has a frontage of 40 feet on ·Second
South and ·extends southerly seven rods from the property line of Second .S:outh Street.
The west line of defendant's property is 125 feet
east of the property line of West ·Temple 'Street. Adjoining the Plaza Hot~l on the south is a 12-foot right-of-way
which extends east from it entrance on West Temp~e
Street to defendant's property, and along the north side
of which there are entrances to the various stores, shop's
and buildings of the occupants of the buildings fronting
on Second South. At a point 75 feet east from West
T·emple the alleyway widens by 2~6. feet and affords access to 'buildings fronting on West 'T·emple and Third
South, as well as ~h-ose. fronting on Second South. 'This
al~eyway has be~n and is used by various p-roperty
owners and tradesmen in making deliVieries.
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The building of the defendant· is. a two-story brick
building erected in 1891. In 1893 a heating plant was
erected on the pr·einises which consisted of a large chimney approximate~y 40 feet high, being an iron stack
fixed to a cement base, which cemet base .extends approximately eight or nine f.eet above the ground; there
is an ·excavated pit "~th cement side wall approximately
eight feet in de'Prth, containing the coal bin and furnace,
·with boiler and stoker. The south cement wall of the
furnace room is ap·proximately on the south prop·erty
line of defendant's property.
The evidence in this case showing the use by the
defendant and app·ellant of this righlt-of-way is not controverted in any manner whatsoeve~ by plaintiffs, and
the only evidence introduced as to the use of the rightof-way is that of defendant. This ·evidence consists of the
testimony of two very elderly witnesses ca.Ued by defendant, one Richard H. Latimer, a co-owner of one-eleventh
interest, and who collected rents for the estate for some
fifty years, and the. other Anton F. Got berg, a retired
tailor, who had occupied the premises since 1890. The
evidence of these witnesses is support·ed by Exhibits
3, 4, 5 a~d 6, being pictures of the· right-of-way. These
witness-es testifi,e·d that the right-of-way had been used
for well over forty years by the occupants and tenants.
of defendant's 'P'roperty in making deliveries. of coal,
merchandis·e, materials required for the repair of tile
building and generally as a means of access for pedestrian and vehicular traffic. 'This evidence: was not controverted in any manner whatsoever by plaintiffs. There is
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no dispute whatsoever on the facts of the use of the
property and right-of-way by the predecessors in interest of def·endant and their tenants and occupants.
Mr. Latimer testified that his father had owned
this property a.s original patentee, and possessed it until
his death in 1881. Mr. Latimer made all collections of
rent for the family, and started such collecting in 1888.
The L~atimer family took over the building now located
on the premises in 1891.
The eoal bin described afor·esaid as a part of the
heating plant had a ca:pacity of five tons ('Tr. 75). At
page 76 of the transcript Mr. Latimer testified that
from the time he took it over, and p-ractically all of the
time, he furnished the heat for the building, and for this
purpose he purchased the coa'l which was brought in by
trucks and wagon though the alleyway claimed by defendant. He described the alleyway and right-of-way
used in bringing the coal in as the 12-foo:t right-of-way
claimed by defendant, and extending from West Temple
east to the heating plant.
At page 76 of the transcript Mr. Latimer also testified that 1these ·deliveries of coal would he from one to
three loads per month, and this fact is also confirmed
by Mr. Gotberg. !The courg.e of this right-of-way was
marked by the red line appearing on plaintiff's Exhibit
A, which 'likewise a})pears at Page 82' of the trans'Cript
in the tes.timony of Mr. L.a!timer.
I

At Pages 84-85 of the transcrip·t appears the testimony of Mr. Latimer where he states that the materials
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for repairing the roof and building were brought in over
this same right-of-way and the alleyway for mixing
mortar to be used in repairing the tbuilding, etc.
In addition to the delivery of coal to the furnace
coal bin, Mr. Gotberg, at P'ages 98-100 of the transcript,
testified that deliveries of coal were also made to !the
location of the tailor shop occupying the west half of
the building for use in the heating and operation of the
shop. Mr. Gotberg, at Page 102 of the transcript, further testified that the alleyway was used in making deliveries of merchandise and groceries for a period of
twenty-five years to the occupants of defendant's pro!perty. l\lr. Gotberg confirmed the :testimony of Mr. Latimer to the effect that deliveries were made by way of
this alleyway; that he observed such deliveries. Mr.
Latimer testified that the r~epairs to the building would
occur in the replacement of a new roof at least every
ten years, and other construction, such as the e:vection
of a brick addition on the southwest corner of defendant's property, which was accomplished by the use of
this right-of-way.
At Page 101 of the transcript, Mr. Go't:berg stat·ed
that for a period of time the upper floors of the building
were advertised as a roominghouse·, hut that most of the
upper floors w·ere us~ed for illegal business; tha:t one of
these "ladies" occupied the p~lace for twenty-five years,
and that their groceries and merchandise were brought to
them through the rear entrance and by way of this a1leyway. Mr. Got berg ide~tified one of these "ladies'' as
''Babe,'' and recalls that the grocery man drove to :the
1
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back of the shop and took the groceries up to her. At
Page 105 of 1the .transcript Mr. Gotberg r~ecalls vividly
the traffic that ·came to the rear entrance of the property,
because he saw the girls jumping the fenee at the rear
without any clothes on, inasmuch as his ''eyes were
not so bad then.''
At Page 107 of the transcript, Mr. Mulliner asked
the witness Got berg on cross-examination:
''Have you ever seen a coal truck actually
come in there, back into the boiler plant~
A. . Oh, yes, I seen that quite often, because
after they had the ·garage building right here,
right there on that corner, they had such a hard
time to get in with. coal, so they sometimes had
to carry it and sometimes had to have an extremely long chute to shoot it down, if they could
get the wagon close enough it was easy to get i1t
into the hole because the hole is in the ceiling of
it. The machine shop is. built on the top of the
ground.''
'
The property claimed by plaintiffs did not at any
time, from the issuance of patent until the conveyance
to the plaintiffs subsequent to 1939, exist in any one
p1erson. The right-of-way crossed at all times property
the title to which was in various individuals. In other
words, the right-of-way never arose by reason of retention by any one owner for his own purpose. The evidence
shows that Second :s:outh from defendant's -corner wes.t
to West ;Temple and east to the Kearns Garage alley is
lined solid wi~h . buildings, and the only acess to the
property of defendant, and p.articular~y for the making
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of' deliveries of coal, etc., had been for many years over
the course of this right-of-way, as claimed and described
by defendant ~s "itnesses, and as appeared in the pietures. Any person, upon viewing ·this property, could
readily see the n1aner in which the delivery. of coal and
other supplies would be made to defendant's proi)erty
by follo,ving this right-of-way as claimed hy defendant.
In connection with plaintiff's motion to strike from
the Bill of Particulars a~l of the material app·earing at
Pages 140 to and including 145 of the transcript, defendant desires to set forth the following facts:
Defendant's cousel having presented a s1tipulation
and order for the settlement of the Bill of Exceptions
in this case in accordance with the transcribed record
of the reporter, being Pages 1 to 139 of the transcript,
and plaintiffs' counsel having refused :to sign the: stipulation, counsel for p~laintiffs and defendant appear·ed
before Judge Van Cott on December 18, 1948, for the
purpose of having the Bill of Exception settled. No written objections had been filed by plaintiffs to the proposed
Bill of Exceptions, but under ithe stipulation as it ap·pears.
on Page 141, Mr. Mulliner was permitted to make oral
objections to the p·roposed bill. Objection was made
by Mr. J\fulliner that as a part of the cross-·examination
of the witness Latimer he stated ithat he did not make
claim to a right-of-way to Mr. Ball or to p[aintiffs or
their p·redecessor in title, and suggestion was made that
this testimony should be added to the transeript.
1
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,At Page 142 of the transcript the exact testimony
as claimed by Mr. Mulliner was stated hy him to he that
the witness Latimer was asked ''whether it had been discussed and whether he was on friendly terms with the
plaintiff and his predecessor in title,'' and the last
statement he made· was to the effect that he had not
claimed a right-of-way so far as plaintiff or his· pr~
decessors in title wer·e concerned. At that page (142)
of the trancript, Judge Van Cott says that in his best
judgment and reco1lection Latimer made the statement
"that he at no time made any claim to a right-of-way, the
one in question.''
As will appear from the transcript, this trial took
place November 28, 1947. This matter was p~resented
to Judge Van Cott December 18, 1948, som·e thirteen
months subsequent to the time the witness Latimer testified. Such :testimony does not appear any place in the
notes of the trial prepared by Judge, VanCott, but there
does appear in Judge Van Cott's notes, in his handwriting, and in the testimony of Latimer, the following
words: ''Never discussed the right-of-way with anyone.''
It definitely appears at Page 90 of the transcript
in the testimony of Latimer on cross-examination, and
at the end of his examination, and in accordance with
the notes of Judge Van Cott, that L·atimer never had
any discussion with any of the owners of plaintiffs'
p~roperty concerning the right-of-way.
Mr. Rasmussen, the -court reporter, at r·age 142 of
the transcript, states that 1the witness Latimer was not

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

a flighty 'Yitness but spoge slowly, and Mr. Rasmussen
felt that he 'vas ab~e to report accurately all that fue
'Yitness said. The certificate of Mr. Rasmussen at Page
139 is to the effect that he caused the shor thand notes
of the testimony to be transeribed, and that the pages
numbered from 1 to 138 consitute a full, true and corriect
transcript of the shorthand notes taken at the trial of
the action and a full, true and correct report of th~
evidence, testin1ony and other proceedings had and given
in said cause on said dates.
1

PE·TITION
Comes now the defendant and appellant and pe~ti
tions this Honorable Court to strike· from the Bill of
Exce'ptions all of the testimony and proceeding app;ea.ring in Pages 140 to i45 of the transcript, together with
the attached notes of Judge Van Cott, and that this.
Honorab1e Court settle as the Bill of Exceptions in this
case the transcript of the evidence, consisting of Pages 1
to 139, together with the exhrbits offered in the cas·e,
together with the judgment roll. This petition is made
upon the files and record in this matter now before
the Su~preme Court, and for the reason that Judge Van
Cott acted without and in excess of his jurisdiction in
settling the Bill of Exceptions and adding purported
testilnony contrary to and not supported by the notes of
the reporter Clyde Rasmussen. ·This petition is made
pursuant to ;Section 104-39-7, U.C.A., 1943.
SPECIFICATIONS ·O·F ERROR
1. 'The Court erred in considering as evidence in
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this case purported testimony of Richard C. Latimer,
as indicated at Page 142 of the transcrip~t, for and upon
the reason that notes of the reporter clearly indicate
that no such evidence was ever introduced in the case,
and that the Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
authority in considering such evidence.
2. 'The Court erred in the order settling the Bill of
Exceptions, wherein the Court has attempted to add to
the reported and transcribed notes of tile court reporter,
purported testimony of Richard Latimer, and including
in the record the Pages 140-14·5 of the transcript, as
contrary to law and fact, and in excess of the jurisdiction
of the Court.
3~

·The Cou:vt erred in its third Finding of Fact, in
this, that it was found that plaintiffs are· now, and that
they and their predecessors in interest have for many
years been, the owners and entitled ~to the possession of
al~ of the lands claimed by plaintiffs in their complaint,
for. and upon the reason that said finding is contrary to
law and to the evidence.

4. :The Court erred in its fourth Finding of Fact,
wherein it excluded from the finding, which shows tthe
piroperty owned by the defendant, the right-of-way claim~d by defendant in defendant's 'Counterclaim, for the
reason that the failure to include the right-of-way in
this Fourth Finding is ·contrary ito law and to the evidence.
5. The Court erred in its sixth Finding of Fact
in this: That it found defendant had not used the south-
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erly portion of plaintiff's property openly, notoriously
and continuously under a claim of right or adversely ~to
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for a pe-riod
of t"\Yenty years immediately preceding the fi~ing of this
action, or any twenty-year period th·ereof~ which finding
is contrary to the law and the evidence.
6. The Court erred in i~ts seventh Finding of Fact
in this: That it found that the defendant had no right,
title or interest to all or any part of the real estate under
consideration belonging to ·the plaintiffs by way of easement or at all, which finding is contrary to the law and
the evidence.
7. The Court erred in its Conclusions of Law, and
particularly the second Conclusion, for the reason that
the same is contrary to the law and is contrary ~to the
evidence.
8. The ·Court erred in its. third Conclusion in that
said Conclusion is contrary to law and is contrary to
and not supported by the facts ..
9. The Court erred in its judgment, and p articularly Paragraph 2 thereof, in ·determining that the defendant take nothing by reason of the countercl~im,
for the reason that said judgment is· contrary to ·evidence
in the case and is not suppor~ted by the Findings or Conclusions of the Court.
1

10. The Court erred in entering its judgment, and
particularly Paragraph 3 thereof, for the r'eason that
said decree is contrary to law and is not supported by
the evidence, findings or conclusions.
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11. The Court erred in entering its judgment, and
particularly Paragraph 5 thereof, in that said judgment
is not supported by the Findings of Fact or ,Conclusions
and is contrary to the evidence and law of the case.
12. The Court erred in entering its judgment, and
particularly Paragraph 6 ~thereof, restraining defendant
from the use of the right-of-way, for and upon the reason
that said judgment is not supported by the evidence,
Findings or Conclusions, and is contrary to law.
13. !The Court erred in ·entering judgment for costs
in the sum of $13.20 for the reason that the judgment
for costs is not supported by the evidence and is contrary
to law.

14. The Court erred in refusing to grant the motion of ithe defendant for a new tria~, particularly upon
the grounds specified in said motion to the ·effect that
the judgment is contrary to the evidence and is against
law.
ARGUMEN'T
The Specifications of Error have, heen group,ed under the following headings and will be consolidated for
the convenience of counsel and court in the headings as
they appear in the argument.

I.
THE CO'URT ERRED IN ATTEM'PTING TO INSERT IN
THE BILL OF EXCEPTIONS THE PURPORTED TESTIMONY O·F ONE OF THE WITNESSES CONTRARY TO THE
TRANSCRIBED NOTES OF THE REPORTER.

Under this heading we are submitting our argument in hehalf of the petition to strike from the Bill of
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Exceptions the purported testimony of the witness Latimer as to 'vhether he did or did not claim the right-of'Yay. '':e feel that in addition to our petition as a matter
of law, Judge \Tan Cott committed error in making this
a p·art of the Bill of Exception, for he has thereby inserted into the record purported testimony of ,the ·witness
Latimer which 'vas never given, and ·evidently considered
evidence in malting his decision which was never introduced and 'vhich was never a part of this case.
First and above aR, we want to state that w·e ea.n
at no time determine as a mental process all of the
inferences or determinations which Judge Van Cott in
his mind attempted to make from such purported evirence. He stated to us in testimony which does not
appear in the notes at the time the Bill was being settled
that he had in his own mind placed great emphasis in
making his decision as to the right-of-way upon the fact
that Latimer had nor claimed such a right-of-way.
~Ir.

Rasmussen's notes, at Page 90, which coincide
with the notes kept by Judge Van Cott, are to the effect
that Latimer never discussed the right-of-way with any
person. The fact remains that the ~testimony and record
in this ease shows that the property had originally come
to the father of the witness Latimer. The reeo;rd further
shows that for a period of forty years or m·ore, Latimer
had only a one-eleventh interest in this property, and
that he collected the rent and purchased the coal for
furnishing heat to the premis·es.
Assuming, therefore, for the purpose of argument,
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that Latimer had never oraHy made a claim to the rightof-way to any of the predecessors in interest of plaintiffs,
the only emphasis that could· be placed upon this is
that Latimer, an owner of one-eleventh interest, has
never said anything to anyone about the right-of-way
by way of claiming it. In other words, Latimer's purpor~ted testimony is that he had never discussed the rightof-way with anyone.
So, consistent with this must he the fact that he
never made any statement of any kind about it, so that
any testimony of Latimer, as aided or interpreted by
Judge Van Cott, would be a reflection of a mental process
of Latimer and not a vocal or physical one. If Judge
Van Cott, ther·efore, was to give any emphasis and, as
he said, base his judgment upon the mental process of
a one-eleventh owner of the property, then we submit
that ther·e is no more elear indication of the error that
Judge VanCott fell into, because, as we wil1 show further
on, there is no necessity or requirement that ~the party
claiming this prescriptiv.e right must vocally proclaim
his intentions to the other party or to the world, and
that his use ·of the right~of-way, or the use of the rightof-way by his tenants for a prescriptive period, is sufficient to establish his right. Judge Van Cott has clearly
d~sregarded that law if he gave any weight or emphasis
(which he indicated he did) to this purported testimony
of the witness Latimer.

We cannot help put feel that this matter goes beyond
this for a judge,

thi~teen

months after a trial, inserts as
1
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purported evidence statements of a witness which do·
not appear in the transcribed notes but which would also
he contrary to the 'vho'le tenor of the wi~tness' testimony
and to his actual statement as ap·pears her~ein. In this
case there "\Vas no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs
as to the use of this right-of-way, and the evidence of
the defendant is clear and conclusive that the right-of"\VRY had been used for a period greatly in exeess of forty
year, and for Judge VanCott to make his judgment, as
he did, contrary to that evidence, it ap·pears to us he was
attempting to find some fact which would sup,port his
conclusion contrary to the evidence, as he appears to
have selected what he thought the witness testified to,
rather than the actual testimony of the witness, to
destroy the effect of that evidence.
In other words, Latimer and Gotberg shared the
use of the right-of-way for over for'ty years, and the
only way that Judge Van Cott eould have ignored all
of that testimony, which was uncontroverted in every
respect, was to attempt to find some flaw, which he
attemp~t.ed to do in basing his decision upon the mental
process of Latimer. Certainly, any purported mental
process of this one-e;leventh owner, Richard Latimer,
will not vary many times the opinion of this Court that
an open' and continuous use for a period of twenty years
established ~the ·p,rescriptive right, nor can it he effective
to any other owner, or the other ten-elevenths interest
in the property.
The petition to strike from the hill and to have the
Supreme Court set,tle the bill, as heretofore mentioned,
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is made pursuant to 104-39-7. And, in this connection
we desire to point out to the Court the fact that the
clain1ed omission from the reported tes~timony of the
question put to the witness, Latimer, and his reply is
contrary to all of the evidence and to the contentions of
Latimer. We desire in this connection to -call {.he Court's
attention to the circumstance appearing at Page 9'1 of
the transcript, and following, wherein Latimer detai~s a
circumstance wher~e one of the tenants, a Mr. Moore, had
been requested by the plaintiffs to change his practice
of parking his car on this right of way. Mr. Mulliner,
in his cross examination of Mr. Latimer, brought out the
fact that the ~plaintiff had requested the witness, Moore,
not to park back there. Mr. Latimer stwted that they
wanted Moore to pay rent, and Moore kicked up a fuss.
He stated that the plaintiffs bought Moore out and took
over a lease of the property. At Page 92 of ~the record,
Mr. Latimer details that l\{oore made a report to Latimer
of this elaim of the plaintiffs' and Latimer, therefore,
went down to talk to the plaintiffs about it. Using Mr.
Latimer's words, he states that Moor;e said the plain·tiffs "were making a little trouble, I went down and
saw them.'' This was in the year 1940, and at tha;t tin1e
Latimer states that his response to the p~aintiffs was
to take them out and show them that they were using
'the west wall of his building as a joint wall. After he
told the plaintiffs this· they didn't say anything mor-e
about Moore's using the right of way.

Latimer states

that on this occasion nothing was said by anyone about
the right-of-way.
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This sho,vs that the immediate reaction of Latimer
to plaintiffs' obj·ection of Moore parking his car in the
right-of-,yay, "\Vas Latimer's assertion of the fact that
they were relying upon an easement in the use of his
party "\Vall, and if they \\'anted to raise any trouble he
would also. ....ls soon as he asserted his rights the plaintiffs had nothing to say about the right of way, and
his testimony is that at no time in all of his history and
connection with the Latimer property had anyone ever
discussed the use of the right-of-way with him, that it
had a:lways been used for the convenience of th·e building.
The ~Ioore incident demonstrated Latimer's reaction to be that he felt they had a right in the right-ofway, and he took a very definite stand in defens,e of that
right, and asserted it in the very manner in which we
would exp·ect of a fine old gentleman, such as he is.
In other words, by his assertion of his rights he let them
know that he was in a position to assert some claims,
if they wanted to question his right, or that of his tenant,
to use that right-of-way.
It is noted that the defendant herein took exception
to Judge Van Cott's settling the Bill of Exceptions with
this additional testimony, (Tr. 144) and that Judge Van
Cott, in disregard of this exception, settled the Bill of
Exceptions.
In the cas·e of Cent-er Creek Water amd Irriga.t!von
Co. vs. Thomas, 19 Utah 360, 57 Pac. 30, at Page 362
of the Utah Report the Supreme Court of this state said:
''If, however there was anything omitted from
the hill of exceptions, which the respondent reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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garded as material, then his counsel ought to have
· -objected on that ground, to the settling of the bill
until the correction was made. Then if the judge,
in disregard of the objection, had settled the
bill, counsel should have taken an exception to
the ruling, and thereupon instituted proceedings
in this court, as provided in Sec. 3289, R. S., to
have the bill corrected and settled in accordance
vvith the facts.
Since the defendant has taken exception and, pursuant to the statut·e, petitioned this Honorable Court to
settle the Bill of Exce'ptions without that additiona~ tesimony, under the authority of this case defendant should
have the Bill of Exceptions settled to include rthe transcript from Page 1 to Page 139, inclusive.
We do not believe that this Honorable Court will
penni t a District Court in settling a Bill of Exceptions
to bring into the evidence of the case testimony that was
never submitted and entered, and to base the judgment
upon or give any weight to such purported testimony.
If this Court will permit the lower District Court to var.y
the evidence as shown by the transcribed notes of the
reporter, then there would be no sacredness in the right
of appeal and no protection whatsoever to the parties
litigant if the District Judge can open wide and. make
his own record of the testimony, and thereby make judgments on facts never presented and 'preclude the injur·ed
party in his right of appeal.
1

We feel that the institution of court reporters and
their place in the lower court, and their accuracy in
reporting testimony, is for a purpose, and was instituted
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to prevent such a thing from occurring as has happened
here. What does it avail us to have highly paid and
trained individuals, able to properly take and transcribe
testimony, if that testimony can be set aside by mere
recollection, especially when that recollection is so contrary to the actual notes of the judge which he himself
kept J? \Y. e submit, therefore, in our Specifications of
Error that Judge \Tan Cott, in failing to consider this
testin1ony and in failing to grant our motion for a new
trial, has committed error for which this Court should
give us r·edress.
1

II.
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE
ACQUIRED l\. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT Q·VER. THE
LANDS OF PLAINTIFFS AS DESCRIBED IN DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM.

The facts in this case show that since 1891 up, to
the time of the trial the right-of-way as -claimed by defendant had been continuously and uninterruptedly and
adversely used by defendant and his predecessors in
interest. The elementary proposition as to the creation
of a prescriptive easem·ent is stated in the Restatement
of the Law of Property, Vol. 5, Section 457, as follows:

''An ·easement is created by such us·e of land,
for the period ·of prescription, as '\vould be 1J rivi1

leged if· an easement existed, p·rovided the use is
(a) adverse, and (b) for the p·eriod of preseription, continuous and uninterrupted.''
The uncontroverted facts show that the owners of
the building h~d for forty years rented the building,
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and, under the terms of the rental, furnished the heat ;
that in furnishing this heat, th~ coal to operate the
furnace was brought to the heating p'lant on defendant's
property over the right-of-way; that in addition, the
tenants in the building us-ed the right-of-way in securing the delivery of merchandise, supplies, etc. This is
clearly shown in the evidence.
Mr. Latimer testified that this heating plant was
put in in 1893 (Tr. 74), and that since its installation
they, , the Latimer family, _have furnished the heat and
ordered the coal for the building ever since ('Tr. 76).
He was asked, "How was the coal brought into this
property~" The reply by Mr. Latimer was, "Brought
in by trucks through the alleyway on the south." (Tr. 76)
Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6 are pictur:es of the right-of-way
and clear'ly show this alleyway and its location in respect
to the heating plant. O·bviously the only means of getting the coal into the plant was by means of this rightof-way. When asked to draw the course taken by the
delivery trucks, 1\rfr. Latimer drew a red pencil mark,
which is shown on Exhibit A and is referred to at Page
82 of the transcript. 'This property remained in the
Latimer family for over forty years and they made use
of this right-of-way all of that time-all of which evidence is without contradiction. Not only did Mr. Latimer
testify to the use of the right-of-way for the deliveries
of coal, but construction work was also carried on in
the rear of his premises, ~d deliveries for the materials
were made by means of this right-of-way (Tr. 80-85).
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The ".,.itness Gotbe.rg testified that he actually saw
the deliveries of coal by means of this right-of-way
(Tr. 99-100). Not only were deliveries of eoal made
by means of this right-of-way, but also deliveries of
groceries and other merchandise were made by this
means (Tr. 101-102). He was asked, "Would there he
any merchandise, any groceries, any deliveries at that
time go into that property~'' To which he replied, ''Yes,
they had the back part of the building that had a kitchen,
but you see, there wasn't on1y one lady - it changed
hands three or four times, but one of them was th·ere
for about 25 years, I guess.'' All of this testimony is
uncontradicted in any manner whatsoever. Mr. G·otberg further testified (Tr. 103) :

'' Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Did you ever see them make any deliveries
of material for the repair of the roof~
To do that with 1
Yes.
They had a tar wagon and al~ out on the
south side of the building.
Would they bring the tar wagon in through
this same right-of-way you have described~
Yes.''

On cross- examination, Mr. Gotherg was asked,
''Have you seen a coal truck actually come in there,
back into the boiler plant~" To which Mr. Gotberg
rHplied, " Oh, yes, I seen that quite often, because after
they had the garage built right in there, right there on
that corner, they had such a hard time to get in the coal,
so they sometimes had to carry it and sometimes had
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an

to have
extremely long chute to shoot it down. If
they could get the wagon close enough it was easy to
get it into the hole, because the hole is in the cei'ling of it.
The n1achine shop is built under the ground, under the
top of the ground.''
The evidence ·shows that all of the use heretofore
mentioned was made without asking the permission of
any person; was made openly, notoriously and with a
claim of right. No objection was ever made to the use
of the right-of-way.
On cross-examination Mr. Latimer was asked (Tr.
90) : '''The question of your using this· right-of-way,
using, you say, Mr. Latimer, and I believe you're right,
in this, that the question of these people in this part
using this entrance to get to the back of the premises
has never been discussed by you at all, has it~ . To this
Mr. Latimer replied : ''I never had any trouble with
anybody ahout it..'' Then Mr. Mulliner asked, ''And it
has never been even ta1ked of, has it~" The reply was,
"No."
At Page 91 of the transcript Mr. Mulliner asked
Mr. Latimer: "Your relations with Mr. Sdrales and
Mr. Latses have always been friendly and neighborly
·while you have been there~'' To this Mr. Latimer replied: "Yes, ~ir." Even in the one instance when one
of Mr. Latimer's tenants was parking his car in this
alleyway and the question arose over his right to so
park, no objection was made by Mr. Sdrales or Mr.
Latses over the use of this right-of-way (Tr. 93).
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In the lTtah ease of Zollinger v. Fr,ank, 110 Utah ·514,
175 Pac. (2d) 71±, at Page 715, in s'peaking of the character of use nere~~ary to initiate a prescrip·tive right,
our court said :
~"Regardless of the words used to characterize this elen1ent of the nature of the use necessary
to give rise to a prescriptive easement, it is our
opinion that the courts mean that the use must
be against the owner as distinguished from under
the owner.''
And again, at Page 716, our court· stated:
"We think the better rule is that described
as the prevailing rule in the above quotation.
· That is, where a claimant has shown an open
and continuous use of the land for the prescriptive period (20 years in Utah) ~the us·e will be
presumed to have been against the owner and
the owner of the servient est~te to prevent the
prescriptive easement from arising has the burden of showing that the use was wnder him instead of against him. This rule was mentioned in
the recent case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Co. v. Moyle, Utah, 159 P. 2d 596, (on rehearing)
174 P. 2d 148, 155, where it was said: 'It is true
that to ·establish an easement the use must be
notorious and continuous and on this adverseness-that is, holding against the ·owner-will be
presumed.' See also Northwest Cties Gas Co.
v. Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash. 2d, 75, 123. P. 2d
771; Eagle Rock Corporation. v. Idamont Hotel
Co., 59 Idaho, 413, 85 P. 2d 242; Fleming v. Howard, 150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908; Stetson v. Young·quist, 76 Mont. 600, 248 P. 196."
One of the latest Utah cases on this point is that
of D~ahnken v. George Romney & .Sons. C~o., ------ Utah ______ ,
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184 Pac. (2d) 211. It presents a fact situation almost
identica1 with that of this case. That case involved
downtown Salt Lake City business p-roperty on the west
side of J\fain Street, which was serviced by an alleyway
running north from ·Third 'South, and in that case the
witnesses testified that the alleyway had been used from
189~ to 1940 to haul in merchandise of all kinds and
to take out trash; that this use was by the employees
and lessees of the defendant in that case. Also in that
case there had been no eontroversy at any time over the
use of the alleyway until shortly prior to the filing of
the suit.
This court sustained the lower court's judgment that
an easement by prescription had been acquir'ed by the
defendant in that case under a fact situation identical
\vith that in the case we are now presenting to the Court.
In so holding the Court stated as follows :
1

We held in Zollinger v. Frank, Utah, 175 P.
2d 714, 716, that, 'where a claimant (to an easement) lias shown an open and continuous (and
uninterrupted) use of the land for the pres-criptive period (20 years in Utah) the use will be
presumed to have been against the owner and
the owner of the servient estate to prevent the
~prescriptive easement from arising has the burden of showing that the use was under hin1 instead ·of ~against him.'
'''There is no evidence in the record tending
to rebut the presumption of adverse use hy the
occupants of the defendants' premis-es. It was,
therefore, not error for the lower court to adjudge
the defendant Romney to be owner of an ease-
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ment over segments 'A' and 'B' and defendant
Investment (~ompany the owner of an easement
over segment 'B~' said ease1nents appurtenant to
the defendants' lands.''

,,re subn1it, therefore, that the presumption having
arisen, it \Yas then the burden of the plaintiffs to show
that the use \Yas uni!er him instead of ~against him. We
submit that there is no such eYidence in this case.
In \-rol. 28 of Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 736, the
general rule is stated that :
''proof of an open, notorious, continuous and
uninterrupted user for the prescrip~tive period,
without evidence to explain how it began, raises
a presumption that it was adverse and under a
·claim of right, or, as is sometimes stated, raises
a presumptive of a grant, and casts on the owner
of the servient tenement the burden of showing
that the user was permissive or by virtue of
some license, indulgence, or agreement, inconsistent with the right -claimed.''
This rpresumption to which we have referred has
been held in ·a number of cases to he conclusive, a.s
stated in Am. Jur., Vol. 17, at Page 970:
''On the one hand, many courts favor the
view that an adverse user of an easement for the
required period creates a conclusive judicial p-resumption of a prescriptive right by a lost grant,
and that it is not a p·roper question to he submitted to the jury to determine whether this us-er
gives a right.''
vVe submit that where there has been no evidence
introduced to rebut the testimony p·resented by the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fendant, as a matter of law the easement of the defendant had been established, and as a matter of law a grant
of right-of-way would be presumed.
There c.an be no question that the use by the defendant had been for the prescribed period for, as stated
in 17 Am. J ur. at Page 973:
' 'If an easement is claimed by prescription
as appurtenant to other lands, it is not generally
considered necessary for the owner of the doininant tenement to show continued user by himse'lf
for the prescriptive period; he may tack the user
by his predecessors intitle, provided there is no
interval het\veen the successive possessions during which the user was not adverse. It has been
held,. however, that if the right to the· use of a
driveway across neighboring land has not been
specifically conveyed by the successive o"rners of
property, there can he no tacking the rights so
as to build up any claim of right or title to an
·easement by prescription. ·The tacking of periods
of user in respect of leased p~remises is discussed
in another article of this work.''
It is further submitted :that under the ZO'llvnger v.
Frank and Dahnken v. R·omn.ey cases, supra, the open,
continuous and uninterupted use of the right-of-way for
the prescribed period presumes that the use is against
the owner.
We submit that the evidence in ~this case as transcribe~ by the reporter is clearly to the effect that the
use was o-pen, notorious and continuous for almost sixty
years. At Page 142, Judge Van Cott says he has a
recollection, or it is his best judgment, that Latimer
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said he had made no claim to the right-of-way. What
the record shows is that Latimer said he never t,alkerl
\vith anyone about the right-of-\vay. Do \Ve try cases
on the evidence introduced in a case or on the misconception by the Court of the ,evidence 1 Judge Van
Cott cannot justify his decision on facts not in evidence.
This is a most ambiguous statement in any event,
as "\Ye cannot determine from the recollection of Judge
\ . .an Cott whether he meant that Latimer had never
claimed it to any person, or \Yhether Latim,er stated in
court that he did not himself at any time believe he
had an easement or right-of-way. We submit that this
last is so entirely against the whole tenor of Latimer's
testimony as to be wholly without support for the Judge's
recollection.
We have heretofore submitted the testimony showing that from the circumstances surrounding the use of
the right-of-way by Moore, Latimer very definitely
asserted their right to the use of this easement.
The case of z,ollifng.er v. Frank, supra, is well annotated in 170 A.L.R., 7'76, and in that annotation is stated
the general rule and numerous authorities are cited in
support thereof. On Page 778 it says:
"Under common-law principles, any' unauthorized entrance upon another's land is a tort, a
trespass, th·e subject of action~ The right of its
owner is that of exclusive possession; an invasion of that possession is theoretica1ly as much a
breaking of his 'close' as when the latter eonsisted of stockaded ground, and when the law reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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quired any p·erson approaching the stockaded
homestead to blow a horn loudly and thus give
notice that he came openly and peaceably.
''The breach of possession being thus a
wrong, it. is presumed that 'no man would suffer
another to enjoy an easement in his land if he
could help it, an easement being a burden necessarily detrimental to his estate.' Goddard, Easements, ·p. 134. And correlative'ly it is presumed
that 'if one n1an does make such use of another's
property without objection on the owner's part,
it is because he had a right by some instrument
or grant, which is lost or cannot be produced.'
Shaw, Ch. J. in Carrig v. Dee (1860), 14 Gray
(Mass.) 583.
'~Implicit in this view of the relationship of
the parties is the notion that a continuing breach
of the owner's possession without his permission
is adverse to his ownership. Every unauthorized
trip over a way is necessarily adverse to the
owner of the soil and under a claim of right.
Foreman v. Greenburg (1921), 88 W. Va. 376,
106 S. E. 876.
.

'' 'The better definitions do· not use the words
'hostile right'-they say 'provided the use is adverse'." Jacobs v. Brewster ( 1945), 3'54 Mo. 729,
190 S. W. (2d) 894.
''The resulting rule affirmed by a majority
of American courts, though stated in varying
forms, is as follows: Upon its appearing that a
servitude has been enjoyed during the ·period required for prescription, openly, continuously and
uninterruptedly, a presumption arises, in the absence of any other explanation, that the user was
adverse and under a elaim of right. The burden
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is then upon the owner of the soil to show that
the use 'vas permissive, or other,vise that it was
not adverse.''
It has been shown by the evidence and in this brief
that there 'vas a eontinuous use of this easement in
exress of forty years by the defendant and his predeceslO.
sors in interest. It is not necessary for the defendant
to be the sole user for the entire- p·eriod. As long as
there is privity between the predecessors in interest of
defendant, this use may be tacked on to the use of defendant to gain the full prescriptive period.

An annotation in 171 A.L.R. at Page 1279 states the
rule as follows :
'' ~tllthough there are a few cases to the -contrary, the overwhelming weight of authority sup·ports the view that the owner of a dominant
estate need not show continued use hy himself
for the prescriptive period to establish an easement, but may tack the user by his predecessors
in title, where such successive owners are :privies
in estate and their possessions -constitute one continuous possession.''
It is noted that the following Utah cases have applied
this rule:
Bertolina v. Frates (1936), 89 Utah 238, '57 P.
2d 346 (rule applied) ;
Malouf v. Fischer (1945), 108 Utah 35·5, 159 P.
2d 881 (rule applied) ;
Zollinger v. Frank (1946), 110 Utah 514, 175 P.
2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 770 ( ru~e applied).
At Page 1284 ·of 171 A.L.R. authority is cited to
the effect that the use by a tenant can be tacked on to
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the landlord's or subsequent owner's use to complete
the ~period essential to establish an easement hy prescription.

.

I~I.

THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING COSTS TO PLAINTIF'FS FOR THE REASO·N THAT NO COST BILL WAS
EVER SERVED OR FILED WITH THE COURT IN THIS
CASE.

The Court in thise case granted costs to plaintiffs
in the amount of $13..20, which costs are not supported
by the evidence. Costs are a matter of statute, and the
statute of Utah requires that the person who claims his
costs mu.st deliver to the clerk and serve a copy of ·the
cost bill upon the adverse party within five days after
the verdict or notice of the decision of the Court.
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-44-14.
Since the plaint~ffs have failed to file a cost bill in
this case within the prescribed time, or failed to file one
at all, plaintiffs cannot recover costs.
A decision by the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Op!enshaw· v. O:p,ensha~, 80 Utah 9, 12. Pac. (2d) 3'64,
at Page 365 states:
''The right to costs is purely a sta;tutory
right. A litigant -claiming his costs and to whom
the trial court has awarded costs, in order to
recover the same from the adverse party, must
file his cost bill within the time prescribed by the
statute. H·oughton et al v. Barton, 49 Utah ~611,
165 P. 471; Checketts v. Collings (Utah), 1 P.
(2d) 950, 75 A.L:.R. 1393. ·This the plaintiff did
not do. ·Since the cost bill was not filed in time,
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the inclusion in the judgment of the amount
claimed in the bill renders the judgment to tha~
extent contrary to law·. It should be amended
by striking out the costs.''
CONCLUSION
'':e therefore respectfully submit that· the Court
erred in granting costs in the decree, and that plaintiffs
are not entitled to recover any costs 'vhatsoever in this
ease.
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that this
Court should strike from the Bill of Exceptions, Pages
1±0 to 1±5 of the transcript, and that Judge Van Cott
erred in considering and basing his judgment upon
supposed evidence, and which testimony was never introduced in the trial of the case.
We further submit that the trial court erred as a
matter of law and contrary to the evidence in failing
to find that the defendant used the right-of-way openly
and notoriously and adversely for the prescriptive
period, and had acquired a right-of-way by p-rescription
as claimed in his counterclaim. 'The defendant clearly
showed that he had an open, continuous and notorious
use of their right-of-way for a period in excess of forty
years, and that such us-e gives him a p resump,tion of
adverse use necessary to establish a prescriptive easement.. This presumption was never rebutted by the
plaintiffs, nor did they ever show that the use was permissive. The Court erred, and the judgment should be
set aside wherein title is quited in p laintiff and defendant enjoined from using the right-of-way.
1

1
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It is also respectfully submitted that the trial court
erred in granting costs to the plaintiffs, since they failed
to cornply with the statute in furnishing a cost bill in
time, or for that matter at all.
We, therefore, respectfully urge this Court to hold
as a matter of law that the defendant had acquired a
prescriptive easement over the portion of the plaintiffs'
:premises claimed in defendant's counterclaim, and that
this Court should declare as void that portion of the
judgment granting costs to the plaintiffs.
Respectfully submitted,

McKAY, BURTON, NIEL,SEN
AND RICHARDS,
C~ounsel

fo.r Appellant.
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